Distinction of the Buddha's Teachings
from Brahmanism and Sramanism
Bhikkhu Thich Nhat-Tu
I. Preamble
The
major philosophical traditions before the rise of Buddhism can be classified
into two major traditions, Brahmanism and 'Srama.nism.
They again can be categorised into the following
schools of thought: Brahmanism, Materialism, Aajiivikism,
Atomism, Jainism and Scepticism. The last five which
are grouped under the Sramanic tradition are opposed
to that of the first. Brahmanism, the orthodox (aastika)
school of thought, based its metaphysical theories on the Vedas as
the final authority in all matters. Materialism, Aajiivikism,
Atomism, Jainism and Scepticism, the heterodoxy
schools of thought (nastikas), opposed to the
orthodox Brahmanical system and its Vedas. In searching for,
as well as, establishing a new socially human moralism, the Buddha had
renounced all these metaphysical doctrines prevailed before and at his time.
The Brahmanical doctrines of the self (aatman)
and ultimate reality (brahman), the hedonistic materialism of the Cavarka, the Aajiivika theory of
inherent nature (svabhaava), the Jaina theory of action (kiriyavaada)
and absolute scepticism of Sa~njaya
are rejected by the Buddha on the ground that they do not conduce to moralism
and final liberation.
II. Distinction of Buddhism from Brahmanism
1.
Buddhism, as a new philosophical way of life, emerges as a counter-movement
against ethical and metaphysical doctrines of Brahmanism. Buddhism being
a naastika completely rejects the
authority of the Vedas and disproving the Brahmaa
as the lord of all creatures. This epistemologically entails denouncing the
practice of sacrifice as nonsensical and immoral in terms of ethics. According
to the Buddha, the Brahmanical claim that the Vedas, created
by Brahmaa for protection of the moral law,[1]
are Sruti, [2] divine
revelations and the final authority each in every thing
is untenable. The Buddha has indirectly rejected this claim arguing that if no
teachers of the Vedic tradition have had vision of Brahmaa,
the so-called creator of the Vedas and this universe, the talk
of Brahmaa is a blind talk, just as when a string of
blind men clinging to one another, neither can the foremost see, nor can the
middle see, nor can the hindmost see.[3] In the Caanki
Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaaya [4] the Buddha again refutes the authority
of the Vedas, the ancient scriptural statements (poraa.nam mantapadam)
as true while others are false, saying that because no braahma.nas so
far have attained personally direct knowledge of the truth of their statement,
such a claim on authority of the Vedas as truth is just a
groundless faith with no substance whatsoever (ghoso
yeva kho eso lokasmii), or a blind
tradition (andhave.nu).[5] The Buddha goes further rejecting the claim
declaring that this falsity is not merely based on faith (payiruupaasanti)
but also based on the other four grounds, viz., inclination, report,
consideration of reasons and reflection on and approval of an opinion.[6]
2.
The Buddha also rejects the cosmological theories of Braahmanism.
If Brahmaa in the Vedas is considered
as the omniscient, omnipresent, eternal, infinite and ultimate reality, or
being regarded as a mere appearance, a name-and-form,[7] which is one,
non-dual, undifferentiated,[8] non-temporal,[9] non-spatial, non-causal, beginningless, endless,[10] ungrounded, essenceless,
transcendental, invisible, imperceptible, indefinable, incomprehensive and
unknowable[11] he is substituted with the law of dependent origination (Pa.ticcasamuppaada // pratiitayasamupaada)
by the Buddha.[12] In its general formula "so this being, that becomes;
from the arising of this that arises; this not being, that becomes not; from
the ceasing of this, that ceases,"[13] this law explains that all
phenomena and everything in this world are both conditioned (paticcasamuppanna// pratiityasamutpanna)
and conditioning (pa.ticcasamuppaada // pratityasamutpaada); they are, therefore, relative and
interdependent without the first uncaused causer, i.e. Brahmaa.
Being endowed with mutually arising characteristics, this doctrine opposes
theories of past determinism [14] (pubbekatahetu),
of theistic determinism (issara-nimmaana hetu) and of non-causation and non-condition (ahetu-apaccaya-vaada).[15] From this doctrine the
characteristics of existence can be understood as the causally natural law:
"Whether there be or not an appearance of a Tathaagata,
this causal law of nature,[16] this orderly fixing of things[17] prevails,
namely, all phenomena[18] are impermanent, misery and unsubstantial.[19] The
principle of dependent origination (paticcasamuppaada) is
called the middle doctrine (majjhena
dha"mma"m deseti)
because it avoids the extremely biased theories, as mentioned above.
3.
The Brahmanical theory of self (aatman)[20] as the central theme expounded in the Upani.sads is also refuted. The so-called aatman is in fact only the physico-psychological
combination of the five aggregates or groups (pa~ncakkhandha),
viz., the body-group (ruupakkhandha), the
feeling-group (vedanaakkhandha), the
perception-group (sa~n~naakkhandha), the
activities-group (samkhaakkhandha), and
the consciousness-group (vi~n~naanakkhandha).[21]
These five aggregates (pa~ncakkhandha) are all
compounded and all conditioned. Being so, they are all impermanent and all
constantly changing. That is to say, they are of dependently arising and
passing away, so that there is nothing in the nature of a stable, persisting
and eternal entity to be found in them. "Whatever is impermanent is
suffering, is no-self."[22] This fact of fivefold combination of a
personality is "true, not false an unalterable."[23] The Buddha
emphasized that the aatman is
like a mountain stream, which flows fast and is forever changing.[24] There is
no being (sat), there is only becoming (bhava) in it. The arising
(uppaada), disappearance (vyaya)
and changing of what exists (a~n~natatha) are
the three signs of compounded things.[25] The belief in a permanent soul (aatman) not only negates the activities of moral
life but also falls in a form of grasping, a hindrance to spiritual
liberation.[26]
4.
The fourfold caste society of Brahmanism, mistakenly based on the concept of Brahmaa as the creator of the universe, is completely
denounced by the Buddha. According to the Buddha any claim of superiority of Braahman-class over the other classes is untenably social
bias for getting economic privilege and gain. Such an inequality of Brahmanism
is strongly attacked by the Buddha on the following grounds. Biologically, man
is of one species [27] and therefore any claim on the divine origin is
refuted.[28] Ethically, all human beings are equal by birth, sex and race. Only
their moral conduct, which is directed by the intention or choice (cetanaa), makes them noble or ignoble, exacted or
low. According to this moral principle, man’s activities and tendencies make
him a farmer (who cultivates the land), a craftsman (who produces utensils and
instruments), a servant (who serves others for a living), a thief (who takes to
stealing), a soldier (who serves in the army), a teacher (who learns and
imparts knowledge to others), a king (who rules a country), a minister (who
helps the king in governing the country). In short, one is a ruler (khattiya), a priest(braahma.na), a
businessman (vessa) or a servant (sudda) is due to one’s moral behaviour
and actual activities. By birth one is not a braahma.na or an
out-caste (vasala). It is his activities that
make him so.[29] The Brahman’s claim for being superior in society is criticised by the Buddha, who proves that all braahma.nas are in fact womb-born of bramin women in the natural way, not of the
mouth of the Brahmaa, the Creator.[30]
5.
The soteriological theory of Brahmanism, as presented in the Vedas and the
Upani.sad, through purificatory bathing,
sacrifices as well as practice of severe asceticism [31] is rejected by the
Buddha. The Buddha clearly teaches that neither purificatory bathing nor
self-mortification (attakilamathaanuyoga) [32]
can bring about heavenly existence (sagga),
purity (suddhi) or emancipation (vimutti). Bathing oneself in the water of the
so-called sacred rivers as believed of capable of washing away sins and moral
evils in the Vedas is regarded as foolish act in Buddhism. The
classic example of the Buddhist argument against this is that if the water had
such divinely purificatory powers, the aquatic shatters such as fishes, frogs,
tortoises, crocodiles, water-snakes etc., would have become saint or would have
reborn in the heaven, for their constant being in such waters.[33] Disproving
the possibility of washing away sins from bathing in the holy waters, the
Buddha reads a new meaning into the existing rite introducing of bathing
without waters, such as bathing in the Noble Eightfold path. Such bathing is
capable of conducting to liberation.[34]
6.
Ritualism, ceremonialism and sacrifices (ya~n~na//yaj~na) [35] are the most prominent features of
Brahmanism as reflected in the .Rgveda and
the Brahma.nas. These are
most important part of Brahmanical religion. They govern condition of human as
well as animals. "Thing animate or inanimate are all under the magical
spell of ceremony. Gods, men, living beings, lifeless things can all be equally
moved through the power of prayer or sacrifice."[36] Their existence was
for the sake of the ceremony. The practice of human sacrifice was also found in
the Brahma.nas. A Brahma.na named 'Sunah'sepa about to be sacrificed in lieu of the son of a
king was saved. In the another passage of the Braahma.nas I. 8, this kind
of immoral practice is mentioned in detail. The gods killed a man for their
victim. But form him thus killed the part, which was fit for a sacrifice went
out and entered a horse. Thence the horse became an animal for being
sacrificed. The gods the killed the horse, but for the part fir for being sacrificed
went out of it and entered an ox. The gods the killed the ox . . . sheep, goal
etc. The sacrificial part remained for the longest time in the goat, thence it
became pre-eminently fit for being sacrificed. Such bloody sacrifices were
considered to be necessary to propitiate gods.[37] In the Pali texts [38] five
kinds of bloody sacrifices are frequently referred, viz., horse-sacrifice,
human-sacrifice, peg-thrown site sacrifice, drinking of victory or strength,
and the bolts-withdrawn sacrifice or universal sacrifice.[39] In the Discourse
of the Wrong Sacrifice and the Right (Kutadanta
Sutta) of the Diigha Nikaaya [40] these immoral Brahmanical sacrifices
with its three modes and its accessories of sixteen kinds [41] are strongly
criticized by the Buddha, who introduces new kinds of sacrifice, which is not
bloodshed, less difficulty and trouble, but bringing greater fruit and
advantage in this life and hereafter. These consist of (i)
offering to moral sangha including individuals of high moral,
(ii) putting up of a dwelling place (vihaara)
on behalf of the sangha in all the four direction, (iii)
taking refuge in the Buddha, his dhamma and his sangha;
(iv) observing the five moral principles, namely, abstinence from destroying
life, from taking what is not given, from sexual misconduct, from telling lies
and from drinking alcohol, (v) observing the minor morality, (vi) developing
confidence, (vii) controlling the five senses, (viii) cultivating mindfulness,
(ix) Living in content and solitude, (x) cutting off five hindrances and
cultivating the four jhaanas. Thus,
the amoral ceremonialism and sacrificism of Brahamnism is contrastedly
substituted with the socially human moralism of Buddhism, such as love,
sympathy, liberality and humanity etc.
7.
The Pali texts refer a variety of asceticism,[42] such as bovine ascetics (go-vatika) undertaking cow-practice (go-vata) putting a horn on their head and tying a tail and
doing everything done by cows, and canine ascetics (kukkuravatika)
undertaking the dog-practice, by dogs.[43] In denouncing these useless
practices, the Buddha points out their cause and the motive as ignorance and
desired of attention and fame.[44] So far as its consequence is concerned, the
Buddha pointed out that, these practices, despite of torturing the ascetic,
with no profitable state and realisation of vision
and knowledge,[45] would lead them to rebirth in animal world (niraya).[46] Asceticism is not the means of escaping
the saasaara. It is low, vulgar, base,
ignoble and not conductive to good (hiina, gaama, pothujjanika, anariya, anattasaahita). The
Buddha categorises two kinds of austerities: one
torments the self (attantapa), torments others
(parantapa), and torments both self and others
(attantapo ca parantapo
ca), and the other is one that does not torture the body, but
self-discipline, the discipline of the five senses,[47] that is the practice of
the Noble Eightfold Path, leading the practitioner to his final liberation.
Among the two, the Buddha recommends the latter and considers it as the basis
of the life of chastity and fundamental ascetic virtue in Buddhism.[48]
III. Distinction of Buddhism from Sramanism
As
stated earlier that being emerged in the history of Indian thought as a new
doctrine and practice, Buddhism is naturally different from and opposed to
those of old as well as contemporary systems, such as the six heretical
traditions. So many references are found in the Pali canon showing the Buddha’s
attitude, analysis and criticism of his six contemporary heretical teachers and
their doctrines. The model of reference to the six heretical teachers in the
Pali canon is frequently referred to as a group [49] for general purpose, and
causally with a particular heretic [50] for a specific purpose of critique,
though there is no evidence that the Buddha ever met with any of them face to
face. Sometimes, the names of these theory founders are mentioned in full and
sometimes their names are not given.[51] It should be noted here that there is
the case in which some confusion is occurred in identifying the names of these
heretics and their teachings.[52] There is a case, due to the complexity of
their perspective theories, some theory referred to them without mentioning
their perspective names becomes difficult to identify.[53] In most the cases,
the criticisms of the heretics appeared in the Tipi.taka are
frequently made by the Buddha, sometimes by his disciples.[54]
In
his historical visit to the Buddha, King Ajaatasattu
says that he has previously paid visits to the six heretical teachers, whose
doctrines are logically dissatisfied and ethically puzzled as recounted by him
in the Saama~n~naphala Sutta [55]
of the Diigha Nikaaya. These
doctrines can be briefly summed up as follows: (i)
Puura.na Kassapa propounded the doctrine of amoralist
causation or inefficacy of action (akiriyavaada)
denying the intentional actions capable of bearing fruits. That is to say, for
him, there is no merit of doing good and no demerit of doing evil, and as a
consequences this contention leads to the rejection of the validity of moral
distinctions and responsibility;[56] (ii) Makkhali Gosaala denying the causes of things (ahetuvaada)
and maintaining human intention and effort as powerless, advocated determinism
or fatalism (niyati) of six classes of beings saying
that self-purification or final emancipation could only be achievable through a
fatally fixed course in transmigration (sa"msaara);
(iii) Ajita Kesakambalin
uphold the materialistic annihilationism (ucchedavaada/di.t.thi), which identifies the psycho-physical person
(naama-ruupa) with the body (ruupa), rejecting human effort and the world
hereafter (para loka). When the body is dead,
it entails the total annihilation of the psycho-physical person, without the
continuity of the consciousness for bearing moral retribution of his deeds
done; (iv) Pakudha Kaccaayana
believed in atomism of the seven eternal uncreated and noncreative substances
denying psycho-ethical phenomena among with the concept of psycho-physical
person. This thus entails the rejection of moral behaviour
of human beings by saying that there is no crime in killing a person; (v) Niga.n.tha Naa.taputta advocates
the theory of past determination (pubbekatahetu)
maintaining that freedom from bonds is possible through practice of severe
austerity or self-torture and observing fourfold restraint (caatuyaamasa"mvara)
in four directions; (vi) Sa~njaya Bela.t.thaputta,
an ignorant skeptic, refuted to answer, positively or negatively or both or
neither, any doctrine or statement, including moral distinctions and
responsibility of human beings, put to him in question. In this connection,
Bhikkhu Bodhi has rightly pointed out: "In the Brahmajaala
Sutta, his position is included among the "endless equivocators"
or "eel-wrigglers" who are incapable of taking a definite stance on
the vital philosophical questions of the day."[57] The ethical theories of
six heretical teachers can be grouped under four main categories, namely,
materialism (Caaraaka), naturalism (Aajiivikism), Jainism and scepticism.
1.
The Materialists are known by different names: the Caarvaakas,
the Lokaayatikas or the Baarhaspatyas.[58]
Ajita Kesakambali, Puura.na
Kassapa and Pakudha Kaccaayana are known as the Materialists of Ancient India.
Believing in natural phenomena (svabhaava),
they advocate the ultimately eternal reality of matter reducing all phenomena
to four (according to Ajita Kesakambali),
or seven constituents (according to Pakudha Kaccaayana) namely, earth, water, fire, air,[59] happiness,
suffering and life principle (jiva).[60]
Materialism does not believe in the continuity of human existence after death.
This logically follows the denying of moral retribution (kamma//karma),
which leads to moral nihilism (natthikavaada).
The Buddha therefore, regards the materialists as nihilistically amoralists (natthikavaadin).
2.
Aajiivikism, like Materialism, is a school of
Naturalists. The well-known founder of this school is Makkhali
Gosaala. They believe in the ultimate reality of
matter, on one hand, and admit the continuity of human existence after death,
on the other. Thus, they differ from Materialists from the charge of nihilism.
The naturalist philosophy of Aajiivikism is covered
in three important concepts, viz., fate (niyati)
species (sa"ngati) and inherent nature (bhaava, svabhaava).[61]
Fate (niyati) is the principle of coming into
existence. Species (sa"ngati) determines
species of a being as a human or an animal. And inherent nature (bhaava, svabhaava)
determines characteristics and nature of that being. The major Buddhist
rejection of Aajiivikism is on the ground that the
latter does not believe in human effort on the part of individual.[62] The Aajiivikism’s rejection of human effort, thus, entails the
denial of the freedom of will. Following this, purification is impossible by
one’s own transformation but through the fixed cycles of existence (saasaara-suddhi). Thus it
falls into the form of past-determination (pubbekatahetuvaada),
a determined theory against moralism through human effort in the present,[63]
and of the theory of external causation (para kata"m).[64]
3.
Jainism as systematised by Niga.n.tha
Naa.taputta, the Mahaaviira,
is different from Buddhism in terms of epistemology [65] and ethics. So far as
ethics is concerned, Mahaaviira seems ignore the
emphasis on the importance of psychological motive (cetanaa)
of the moral action (karma/kiriya), as
uniquely does the Buddha. For Mahaaviira, bodily
action performed with or without one’s intention will produce equal
consequence. Mahaaviira appears to believe in
partially biological determination and partial human action, when he says
"things are partially determined and partially undetermined" (niyayaaniyayaa saataa).[66]
His ethical theory can be, thus, grouped under past-determination (pubbekatahetuvaada), a deterministic theory
explaining every human experience is due to past action, which is condemned by
the Buddha as against human cultivation of ethics.[67] Another ground on which
the Buddha rejects Mahaaviira’s theory of moral action
(kiriyavaada) is the latter’s advocating
non-doing and expiating one’s past actions by extreme austerities or
self-mortification (attakilamathaanuyoga) [68]
as a means to attain liberation, which is painful, ignoble and
unbeneficial.[69]
4.
Absolute scepticism was known to India philosophy
very early. The founder of this school is known as Sa~njaya
Bela.t.thaputta. He is known
as a theorist of endless equivocation or an equivocationist
(amraavikkhepavaadin).[70] He is extremely
skeptical regarding any kinds of certainty or human knowledge. He escapes from
both negative and positive statements asserting no thesis of his own, even the
thesis of what is good (kusala) and evil (akusala). According to the Buddha, his scepticism is derived from both the fear of falling into
error and the ignorance of giving answer to any question put to him for
discussion. This extreme scepticism or sceptical doubt (vicikicchaa),
according to the Buddha, is a mental hindrance, fetter or defilement, which
will lead to non-development towards achievement of its intellectual and
spiritual goal or to non-productivity of mind (cetokhila).[71]
The
Buddhist scripture [72] shows its suspicion to the common claim of these
heretical teachers of being constantly "all-knowing, all-seeing and
all-embracing knowledge-and-vision."[73] The Buddhist argument leveled
against such a claim starts with a basic question that if they were so achieved
why they had loosen their way when entering a new place and why they did not
know how to escape from trouble while countering a fierce animal like dog,
elephant, horse or a bullock, etc. Moreover, if they were really omniscient,
they would have not asked people their name, clan, the name of a village, a
market town and the way etc. They in fact did ask such questions. This shows
that their knowledge is evidently limited just like that of a average or worldly man (puthujjana//p.rthagjana).[74]
The Greater
Discourse to Saccaka (Mahaasaccakasutta)[75] mentions about the imperfection of the six heretics.
Here in this Sutta, Saccaka, the son
of Jains, disproved their perfection[76] revealing
that they shelved the question by asking another, answered off the point and
evinced anger and ill-will and discontent when taken in hand speech by speech
by him. He admires the Buddha because he found him the contrary: "But
while the Gotama [the Buddha] was being spoken to
thus so mockingly and was being assailed by accusing ways of speech, his colour was clear and countenance happy like that of a
perfected one, a fully Self-awakened one."[77] This shows that the Buddha
is really of unique perfection, which is unparalleled by the six heretical
teachers.
In
the Sandaka Sutta [78] of
the Majjhima Nikaaya, the
doctrines of the first four heretics are called amoralism
(abrahmacariya), for they among with the other
two heretics maintaining more or less the theory of no moral causation (akiriyavaada). Their doctrines are altogether
rejected as wrong theories (micchaadi.t.thi),
their thought as wrong thought (micchaasa"nkappa)
and their speech as wrong speech (micchaavaacaa).
According to the Buddha, the profounders of akiriyavaada are to reject three ways of moral
conducts (sucarita), namely, moral bodily
conduct (kaaya-sucarita), moral conduct in
speech (vacii-sucarita) and moral conduct in
mentality (mano-sucarita). This rejecting of
moral action and its consequences logically entails the attitude of being
engaged and enjoyed in threefold evil conduct (duccarita),
which is the basis of degeneration of human ethics. In other words, those who
fail to see the principle of moral causation (kiriyavaada)
will surely maintain that there is no action (karma), non-causation of
things (ahetuvaada), no the world beyond (para
loka). Such theorizers as well as their followers
would be blamed in this very life (idha loka) and after passing away from this world they
will go to a state of suffering (duggati).[79]
As the case being the doctrines of the six heretics were criticized by the
Buddhists as lacking of the principle of righteousness (kusala-dhamma).
These were rejected as unworthy to be followed and therefore one should avoid
to devotion and practice as soon as possible.[80]
IV. Conclusion
Denouncing
all Indian ethical theories preceding and contemporary with him, the Buddha
adopted and introduced a middle standpoint for his epistemology and ethics
known as the theory of dependent origination (Pa.ticcasamuppaada//pratiitayasamupaada).
With this new morally middle doctrine (majjhena
dha"mma"m deseti),
the Buddha rejects all kinds of extremist theories, such as permanent existence
and nihilistic non-existence, strict determinism, past-determination, theistic
determination as well as non-causation-and-non-conditionality, as
follows:
1.
The extremes of existence and non-existence or being and non-being. The former
is the theory admitting that everything exists (sabbaa
atthii ti), while the
later advocating that nothing actually exists (sabbaa
natthii ti ).[81]
2.
The extremes of eternalism (sassatavaada)
and annihilationalism (ucchedavaada).[82]
If eternalism admits that one and the same person
both performs actions and experiences the results, then annihilation admits
that one performs actions, another experiences the results.
3.
The extremes of past-determination (sabbaa pubbekatahetuvaada) or theistic determination (sabba issaranimmaanavaada)
and non-causation-and-non-conditionality (sabaa
ahetu-apaccaya-vaada).[83] The first advocate
that all human experience, suffering or happiness are determined either by
actions performed from the previous lives, or by an almighty God, whereas the
last admitting all phenomena and human experience are happened without causes
and conditions.
4.
The extremes of attakaaravaada, the
belief that ‘pleasure and pain brought about by one’s self, and parakaaravaada, the belief that ‘pleasure
and pain brought about by another.’[84]
5.
The extremes of Kaarakavedakaadi-ekattavaada and Kaarakavedakaadi-naanattavaada. The
former is the belief that the doer and the receiver of deed are the same,
whereas the latter is the belief that the doer and the receiver of deed are
different.[85] If the Braahmanical teachings of
the Vedas and Upani.sads represent
a theistic theory of ethics, the Sramanic thinkers
like Puura.na Kassapa, Ajita
Kesakambali, Pakudha Kaccaayana, Makkhali Gosaala, Niga.n.tha Naa.taputta and Sa~njaya Bela.t.thaputta etc., represent some form of amoralism (e.g. nihilistic materialism, non-causationalism and determinism), the Buddha’s teachings (dhamma)
are positive assertions of a rational-psychological moralism, which is socially
and universally acceptable.
Abbreviations and References
1. Texts
A. = A"nguttara-Nikaaya, I-V, ed. R.
Morris, E. Hardy, C. A. F. Rhys Davids. (London: PTS,
1885-1900)
BU. = B.rhadaara.nyaka Upani.sad
ChU.
= Chaandogya Upani.sad
D. = Diighanikaaya, I-III, ed. T. W. Rhys David and J. E. Carpenter,
(London: PTS, 1889-1910)
DA. = Diighanikaaya A.t.thakathaa, I-III, ed. T. W. Rhys David and J. E. Carpenter,
W. Stede. (London: PTS, 1886-1932)
Dhp.
= Dhammapada, ed. K. R. Norman and
O. von Hinuber. (London: PTS, 1931)
DhpA.
= Dhammapada A.t.thakathaa, I-V, ed. H. Smith, H. C. Norman, L. S. Tailang. (London: PTS, 1906-15)
Dhs.
= Dhammasa"nga.nii, ed. E. Muller. (London: PTS, 1885)
EB. = Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, I-V, ed. G. P. Malalasekera.
(Ceylon: 1945-1994)
It. = Itivuttaka, ed. E. Windisch. (London: PTS,
1890)
Khp.
= Khuddakapaa.tha, ed. Mrs. C.A.F. Rhys Davids.
(London: PTS, 1931)
KU. = Ka.tæ ha
Upani.sad
M. = Majjhimanikaaya, I-IV, ed. V. Trenckner,
R. Chalmers, Mrs. Rhys Davids. (London: PTS,
1888-1902)
MA. = Majjhimanikaaya A.t.thakathaa, I-V, ed. J. H. Woods, D. Kosambi,
I. B. Horner. (London: PTS, 1922-38)
MaU.
= Maa.n.dukya
Upani.sad
MuU.
= Mu.n.daka Upani.sad
PTS. = Pali Text Society
.RV.
= .Rgveda
S. = Sa"myuttanikaaya, I-V, ed. L. Feer and
Mrs. Rhys Davids. (London: PTS, 1884-1898)
Sn.=
Suttanipaata, ed. D. Andersen and H. Smith. (London: PTS, 1913)
'SvetU.
= 'Svetaa'svatara Upani.sad.
Thig. = Theriigaathaa, ed. R. Pischel. (London: PTS,
1883)
Ud.
= Udaana, ed. P. Steinthal. (London: PTS, 1885)
Vbh.
= Vibha"nga, ed. and tr. by S. K. Mukhopadhyaya.
(Santiniketan: 1950)
Vin. = Vinayapi.taka, I-V, ed. H. Oldenberg. (London: PTS,
1879-83)
Vism.
= Visuddhdimagga, ed. H. C. Warren and D. Kosambi. HOS.41.
(1950)
2. Studies
Barua, Benimadhab.
(1998) A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy. Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass, 1st Ed. 1921.
Bodhi, Bhikkhu
(1989) The Discourse on Fruits of Recluseship,
the S ma–– aphala Sutta and
Its Commentaries. Kandy: Buddhist
Publication Society.
Kalupahana,
David J. (1975) Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. Honolulu:
The University Press of Hawaii.
Kalupahana,
David J. (1994). A History of Buddhist Philosophy, Continuities and
Discontinuities. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
1st Ed. 1992.
Kalupahana,
David J. (1994). A History of Buddhist Philosophy, Continuities and
Discontinuities. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
1st Ed. 1992.
Sinha, Jadunath. (1999). Outlines of Indian
Philosophy. Delhi: Pilgrims Book Pvt. Ltd, 1st Ed. 1963.
NOTES
[1] KU. i. 3, 11-2; 1, 2, 12&24; MuU. ii.
1, 5-7; 2, 3-5; BU. ii, 4. 10. Cf. BU. iv. 4,
22; ChU. iii, 24, 2; viii. 1,
5; 7, 1; iii. 14, 2; KU. i. 2, 13;
ii. 3, 17; 2, 18; MuU. ii. 2,
7, 10-12; iii. 1, 5; 1, 6-9; 2, 11-13.
[2] Literally means
"hearing" in Sanskrit. This is so-called because it was not written
down but transmitted orally from the teacher to his followers.
[3] D. I.
238ff. Cf. M. II. 170; MLS. II. 360.
[4] M. II.
164
[5] M. II.
84.
[6] M. II.
170; MLS. II. 360. These five grounds also recur at S. II.
115, IV. 138; KS. II. 82; IV. 88. Cf. A. I.
190, II. 191.
[7] KU. i. 2. 21; ChU. vi.
1, 14.
[8] ChU. vi. 2. 1; 'SvetU. iii, 9; BU. ii. 4, 14; iv,
4, 19; KU. ii. 1, 11.
[9] KU. i. 2, 14-20; ii. 1, 5, 12-3; MaU. i, 1, 7; MuU. iii.
1, 7; BU. ii. 5, 9; iii, 8, 8; iv. 4, 15-6.
[10] KU. i. 2, 14; 'SvetU. vi.
9.
[11] KU. i. 2, 18.
[12] This unique law of
dependent origination or causal uprising (paticcasamuppaada)
was discovered by the Buddha on his attainment of perfect enlightenment. Ud. 1-2.
[13] S. II.
27f, 64f, 95; KS. II. 23, 45, 66: imasmii
sati idaa hoti, imassupaada idam uppajjati; imasmii asati idaa na
hoti, imassa nirodhaa idaa nirujjhati. Vide
also M. III. 63; MLS. III. 107, and Ud. 2.
[14] This view is
examined at M. II. 214; MLS. III. 3ff.
[15] Cf. A. I.
173ff; GS. I. 157ff.
[16] Dhaatu-dhammatthitataa = sbhaava-tthitataa, ‘that
which, as cause, establishes elements as effects’.
Quoted from GS. I. 264, note 3.
[17] Dhamma-niyaamataa ‘that which, as cause, invariably fixes
things in our minds, as effects’. Cf. S. II. 25; KS.
II. 21, where a further term is added, idappaccayata,
‘the relation of this to that’. Quoted from GS. I. 264. n. 4.
[18] The meaning
of sankhaara can differ according to
contexts. In the context of the five aggregates of existence (khandha), sankhaara tends
to mean bad thoughts that a person harbors, and so its sense is psychological;
but in the context of the three characteristics of existence (tilakkhana), sankhaara tends
to mean all phenomena or compounded things, be they physical or psychological;
in other words the whole of the five aggregates of existence.
[19] Also see in Dhp.: Sabbe
sankhaara aniccati (277); Sabbe sankhaara dukkhaati (278); Sabbe
dhamma anattaati (279).
[20] MuU. ii. 2, 11; iii. 1, 1-2; 2, 1; KU. i. 2, 18; 3, 3-4, 9-10; ii. 2, 13; 'SvetU. i. 9-10, 12; iii.
19; ChU. iv. 15, 4; BU. iv.
4, 22; ii. 5, 15. For detailed treatment of the Upanisadic
aatman, see for example Sinha (1999):
31-7.
[21] S. III,
p. 50.
[22] S. III.
67; KS. III 59f. Also see M. III. 329.
[23] S. V.
430; KS. V. 365.
[24] A. IV.
137; GS. IV. 92: Just as a mountain river, winding here and
there, swiftly flowing, taking all along with it, never for a moment or for an
instant or for a second pauses, but rushes of, swirls along and sweeps forward;
even so, braahman, like a mountain river is the life
of man, insignificant, trifling, fraught with ill and trouble… For the born
there is no immortality.
[25] A. I.
152; GS. I. 135: "Monks, there are these three
condition-marks of that which is conditioned. What three? Its genesis is
apparent, its passing away is apparent, its
changeability while it persists is apparent. These are the three
condition-marks…"
[26] EB. III.
328b.
[27] Sn. 600-611; M. II.
196ff.
[28] M. II.
148ff; D. I. 80ff; III. 80ff.
[29] Sn. p.
23. Reference is from EB. V. 116b.
[30] D. III.
81-2; DB. III. 78-9.
[31] Detailed account of
these practices is repeatedly found at D. I. 165ff; III. 6-7,
37ff; A. I. 294; II. 207; M. I. 77ff.,
238ff., 342, 387, 524.
[32] M. I.
240ff: This is considered as another extreme of practice vs. self-indulgence (kaamasukhallikaanuyoga).
[33] Thig. 240-1.
[34] S. I.
38.
[35] On Braama.nas’ sacrifices, see M. I.
343-44; S. I. 75; A. IV. 41; D. I.
127, 141.
[36] Tachibana (1986):
39.
[37] Tachibana (1986):
40-1.
[38] For example
at S. I. 76; A. II. 42; IV. 151; It. 21; Sn. 303
etc.
[39] For meaning of
these sacrifices, see KS. I. 102, n. 1.
[40] D. I.
144ff; DB. I. 182ff.
[41] For their content,
see DB. I. 174, nn. 3-4.
[42] In Buddhism there
are also thirteen ascetic practices (dhuta"nga).
These are not considered by the Buddha as the path leading to liberation but
rather an alternative preparation to the path. For a full account see EB. II.
168. Cf. M. III. 39-42; DhpA. I.
141; Vism. ch. ii.).
[43] M. I.
387ff; D. III. 6-7.
[44] D. III.
44-5.
[45] S. IV.
338.
[46] M. I.
388.
[47] D. III.
232.
[48] S. I.
38.
[49] See, for instance,
at D. I. 56ff; M. I. 517ff; M. II.
2-4; S. I. 69ff. Sometimes only two heretics are mentioned,
for example, at A. IV. 47 only Puura.na and Niga,n.tha are dealt with for
comparison.
[50] See, for example,
at S. III. 211; A. III. 383.
[51] For instance,
at M. I. 513-524; S. III. 207, 211.
[52] For instance,
at S. IV. 398: Ajata is confused
with other heretics; at A. I. 286: Ajata
with Makkhali; at A. III. 383: Makkhali with Pakudha and
Puura.na. For further evidence to support this, see E. Thomas (1997): 130f.,
Bhikkhu Bodhi (1989): 7 n.2; and KS. III. 17- n.2
[53] E.g. M. I.
407, 515-17; S. III. 208, 210.
[54] For example,
at M. I. 515ff, Ananda is said to have analysed
and then refuted the teachings of the heretics, whose names are not
mentioned.
[55] D. I.
51-59.
[56] Cp. Bhikkhu Bodhi
(1989): 7.
[57] Bhikkhu Bodhi
(1989): 9.
[58] On two kinds of
Materialism, see Kalupahana (1975): 26-32; Kalupahana (1994): 13-4.
[59] D. I.
55.
[60] D. I.
56.
[61] D. I.
53.
[62] M. I.
81-2.
[63] A. I.
173.
[64] Kalupahana
(1975): 53.
[65] For account on Mahaaviira’s epistemology, see B. M. Barua
(1998): 400-4; Kalupahana (1994): 17-9.
[66] SuutrakÙ taa"nga I. 1.2.4.
[67] A. I.
173. For scrutiny of this point, see Kalupahana
(1994): 19f.
[68] M. II.
222.
[69] S. V.
421.
[70] D. I.
58.
[71] EB. IV.
s.v. doubt: 667a.
[72] M. I.
519-20; MLS. II. 199. Cf. M. I. 92-3; A. I.
220.
[73] Their claims of
this attainment can be found at many palaces in the Tripi.taka,
see for instance, at A. I. 220-1; A. IV.
428; M. I. 482, 519; M. II. 31, 519-20.
[74] M. I.
519-20; MLS. II. 199.
[75] M. I.
250-1; MLS. I. 305.
[76] Including the Jaina leader Niga.n.t.tha Naathaputta.
[77] Tr. by
Horner, MLS. I. 305.
[78] M. I.
513.
[79] A. I.
33 says "When doctrine and discipline are wrongly expounded
he who strives energetically live a miserable lives." Tr. by F. L.
Woodward, GS. I. 30.
[80] M. I.
519. Apart from the criticism levelled against the six heretics, this Sutta also
rejects the traditionalist and the rationalist. M. I.
520f.
[81] S. II.
17; KS. II. 13. Also see in S. III. 134f; KS . III. 114; and S. II. 76; KS. II.
52.
[82] S. II.
20; KS. II. 16.
[83] A. I.
173.
[84] S. II.
22f; KS. II. 18f.
[85] S. II.
75; KS. II. 52.