Some
Characteristics of the Buddha's Teachings
Bhikkhu
Thich Nhat-Tu
1. The Buddha's
teachings (Buddha-dhamma) is a morally philosophical system (dhammaniyaama), which expounds a unique path of
enlightenment (bodhidhamma) or emancipation (mokkhadhamma). This moral doctrine (dhammavadaa / kammavaada)
is, certainly, to be studied, more to be practiced and above all, to be
realized by every one. The pragmatism is a remarkable
characteristic of the Buddha's teachings [Dhp. 19,
20]. This characteristic is, however, of twofold aspect, notably, empirical
aspect of inquiring or answering a question and the practice of dhamma or
morality (dhammaanudhammapa.tipatti)
in accordance with knowledge. So far as the latter is concerned, the Buddha
states that in his moral system, knowledge and practice should be parallel
hand-in-hand in bringing about supreme happiness (nibbaana).
According to Buddhist ethical system, mere learning is of no use in terms of
its consequence (vipaaka). The learned man (bahussuta) who does not practice morality (siila) is just like a beautiful flower without
scent. To put it in another way, the mere knowledge of something, for
example, nibbaana does not amount to
that something, here to nibbaana. What
one can learn from the above passage is that to attain the spiritual
enlightenment one is advised to practice meditation in order to experience it
in your own person. As to the knowledge not pertaining to ethical practicality,
there are some questions, the Buddha is remained unanswered (avyaakata / avyaak.rta)
[M. I. 426-32; 483 ff; M. II. 228-38; S. III.
213-24; 257ff.; S. IV. 374-403]. In the Pali canon, there are ten
unanswered questions in number consisting of four sets of questions, the first
three having only two alternatives each and the last one, four. The first two
sets deal with the metaphysical nature of the world, the third set with
soul-body and the last set with the Tathaagata. These
ten questions are:
(1-4)
a. Is the world eternal? (sassato loko), b. Is the world not eternal? (asassato loko), c.
Is the world finite? (antavaa loko), d. Is the world infinite? (anantavaa
loko),
(5-6)
e. Is the soul identical with the body? (taa
jiicaa tam sariiraa),
f. Is the soul not identical with the body? (a~n~naa
jiivaa a~n~naa sariiraa),
(7-10)
g. Does Tathaagata exists after death? (hoti tathaagato paraa nara"naa), h. Does
Tathaagata not exist after death? (na hoti tathaagato paraa mara"naa), k. Does Tathaagata
both exist and not exist after death? (hoti
ca na ca hoti tathaagatho paraa mara"naa), and m. Does Tathaagata
neither exist nor not exist after death? (neva
hoti na na
hoti, tathaagato paraa mara"naa)
[at D. I. 191; D. II. 68; D. III.
135-7; M. I. 484-5; M. II. 233; S. III.
257; S. IV. 393; A. II. 41].
The
reasons for not answering these questions are that they are outside the
pragmatic framework and worthless or irrelevant from its ethically immediate
concern, commitment and purpose, as the Buddha says in the Cuu.la-Maalu"nkyasattu of the Majjhima-Nikaaya: "because these questions are
not profitable, not basically conductive to holy life, nor leading to aversion,
to detachment, to cessation, to tranquillity, to
supernatural knowledge, to perfect enlightenment, to nibbaana."
[M. I. 43]. The Buddha's teachings are attempting to work out with
human suffering and its cessation, wherein answering these questions would have
simply added to endless and fierce controversy, which is void of ethical
significance. The Buddhist ethics is repeatedly emphasized by the Buddha as
being preoccupied with the problem of human suffering and the way leading its
utter cessation: "O, monks, what I have revealed is that this is
suffering, this is arising of suffering, this is the ceasing of suffering and
this is the practice leading to the ceasing of suffering" [S. V.
437]. The parable of Poisoned Arrow [M. I. 429; MLS. II.
99-100] and the parable of Sim'sapa-Leave
[S. V. 437; GS. V. 370] sufficiently prove that
the Buddha's teachings are of great practicality. The Buddha is interested only
in those questions, whose answers are somehow helpful in eradicating human
suffering. The ethical meaningfulness of the questions is the principal
parameter of its answers. Empirical validity of the questions is another
parameter to consider whether questions are worth answering or not. These are
interrelated criteria for the practicality of Buddhist ethics. In brief, the
Buddha only teaches "the ethical teachings or the truth which are
profitable, basically conductive to holy life, leading to aversion, to
detachment, to cessation, to tranquillity, to
supernatural knowledge, to perfect enlightenment, to nibbaana"
[M. I. 431].
2. The Buddha's
teachings are human-based orientation. It has autonomous criterion as its moral
principle. Here, one has to strive for one’s own enlightenment individually
through personal effort without any help from God. The struggle for moral
perfection and spiritual enlightenment is possible only on the basis of one’s
own energy or performance. The Buddhist is one who is responsible for whatever
good or bad done by him. Strive on kusala with
diligence is the constant advice of the Buddha (Buddhaana
saasana"m). No purification or emancipation
can be possible without personal training of morality. This purification is of
threefold practice [Dhp. 183; D. II.
39]. "Not to do evil" (Sabbapaapassa
akara.na"m) is the first negative
performance of Buddhist ethics, in terms of perfecting oneself. This is
followed by "performing what is morally good" (kusalassa
upasampadaa) as the second positive performance
of kusala in terms of benefiting
others. "Purifying one’s mind" (sacittapariyodapana"m)
is the final advice as the most important factor leading to doing good and
abandoning evil. In other words, the Buddha's teachings not only advise one to
refrain from committing physical, vocal and mental misdeeds, but also, at the
same time, instruct one to perform certain physical, verbal and mental moral
conduct as well. And this individual and social direction of morality is based
on the basis of purification of one’s own mind, the forerunner of every kamma [Dhp. 1-2].
Such a scheme of moral trinity is aimed at bringing about happiness and benefit
for all human beings in this very life and the hereafter.
3. The Buddha's
teachings can be considered as an ethical rationalism. All kinds of dogmatism
and moral authorities without one’s own rational justification are unacceptable
to the Buddhist ethics. The Buddha bases his teaching of morality (dhamma)
on empirical knowledge instead of being known and realized intuitively [M. I.
520; D. I. 16]. The Buddha's teachings are a
"come-and-see ethics" (ehipassika
dhamma) [M. I. 37], which rejects all external authorities as a
means for the attainment of the summum bonum and
recommends the use of one’s own reason and personal exertion. The Buddha's
teachings reject both animism and ritualism and emphasize rationalism. The most
distinctive feature of the Buddha's teachings are its
freedom from theism, which leaves room for rationalism and rules out submission
to some super-human power controlling the world-process. It should be noted
here that Buddhist ethical rationalism should not be confused with mere
rationalism in the sense that the latter is based only on logic or power of
argumentation.
4. The Buddha's teachings
are based on the moral law of kamma, which
altogether condemns accidentalism (ahetu-apaccayavaada),
theistic determinism (assarakara.navaada
/ issaranimmaanavaada) and past-action
determinism (pubbekatavaada / pubbekatahetu). Accidentalism (ahetu-apaccayavaada or ahetuvaada) is an indeterminist theory, which holds
whatever is experienced is uncaused and unconditioned. Theistic determinism (assarakara.navaada / issaranimmaanavaada) is a determinist theory, which
held whatever is experienced is due to the creation of a Supreme Being.
Past-action determinism (pubbekatavaada / pubbekatahetu) is a determinist theory, which holds
whatever is experienced, whether pleasure or painful or indifferent is due to
past actions [A. I. 173-9]. These erroneous theories are believed
to conduce to moral and cultural degeneration. These views are harmful and,
therefore, bound human beings to the bondage of a discouraged passives and
blind acceptance. Buddhist ethics is based on the law of moral retribution (kamma). Accordingly, moral improvement or
degeneration, ascent to heaven or descent to hell, happiness or suffering etc.
are the result of our intentional deeds (kamma
vipaaka). In an important text, the Buddha
convincingly refutes these erroneous views (dii.t.thi)
as follows:
If
these were so, then, owing to accidentalism . . . theistic determinism . . .
and past-action determinism, men will become murderers, thieves, unchaste,
liars, slanderers, covetous, malicious. Thus for those
who fall back on these three erroneous views as essential reason, there is
neither the will to do what is ought to be done, or not to do what is ought not
to be done, nor necessity to do this deed or abstain from that deed. For them,
no moral improvement or intellectual culture can be expected from them [A. I.
173; GS. I. 157].
This
passage of the sutta quoted here is to show clearly that
Buddhist moral law of retribution springs and bases on one’s own intention (cetanaa) at the present rather than the past or
dependent on God’s will or accidentals. The Buddha lays tress on the nature of
whatever is done is received by human beings in order to enable man to observe
and take care his deeds consciously. Although the Buddha teaches "living
beings are owner of their own kamma,
heirs of their kamma, have kamma as the wombs from which they spring,
having kamma as their refuge; kamma marks of living being, making them become
depraved and excellent," he further clarifies that kamma, as an intentional deed done by man, is
subject to change according to one’s thinking, acting and improvement of
whatever has been done by him earlier [Dhp. 172].
Buddhist law of kamma denies the
heretical determinism and accidentalism, whether theistic or past-action, since
one is free to act for better or for worse and for more goodness or for more
badness within situation, which his kamma has
produced. This is to say one can make oneself better through good counteractive
kamma or destructive kamma
or supplanting kamma (upaghaataka-kamma
/ upacchedaka-kamma), which can destroy the
already produced bad kamma [ibid].
5. Altruism is
another characteristic of the teachings of the Buddha. The Buddha taught his
ethics (dhamma) for the sake of something specific (yassa
ca khvaassa atthaaya),
leading onwards (niyyaati) the doer of it to
the complete destruction of suffering (dukkha pamocana"m)
[M. I. 69]. The Buddha is described as ‘concerned for the welfare
of his fellow-man’ (bahujana hitaanukampii) [Sn. 693; A. III.
355] and as ‘sympathetic to all creatures’ (sabbabhuutuunukampii)
[A. II. 9]. His ethico-philosophical
teaching (Buddhadhamma) is the end-maker of
anguish [M. I. 129] and ‘his teaching morality (dhamma) is
not from duty, but out of compassion and sympathy.’ [S. I. 206]. It
is also believed as ethical system, "that sets upright what had been
upset, discloses what was covered, shows the way to the one who had gone to
astray, brings an lamp into the darkness so that those
with vision might see material shapes" [M. I. 24]. The
altruistic nature of the Buddha's teachings can be seen clearly in his first
missionary massage to the first sixty enlightened disciples, exhorting them to
teach the morality (dhamma) to human beings:
Go
forth, O bhikkhu, for the welfare of the manyfolk,
for the happiness of the manyfolk, out of compassion
for the world, for the good, the welfare, the happiness of devas and
human beings. Let not two go by one way. O bhikkhu, preach the dhamma,
excellent in beginning, excellent in the middle and excellent in the end, both
in spirit and in language. Proclaim the holy life, perfect and pure
morally.
I,
too, O bhikkhu, will go to Uruvela in Senaanigaama, in order teach the dhamma. Hoist
the flag to the Sage. Proclaim and teach the sublime dhamma. Work
for the good of others, you have done your duties [M. I. 22].
Accordingly,
the Buddha himself and his disciples, with no permanent residence, wandered
from place to place to teach the perfect morality (paramattha
dhamma) out of compassion for others. Being freed from all sensual bonds,
their main purpose was to proclaim the moral life and to work for moral
upliftment of the human beings, both by physical example and verbal teaching.
The Buddha further teaches that one should intentionally perform any behavior (kamma) yielding happiness (sukhadraya)
and resulting in happiness (sukhavipaaka),
whereas avoiding volitional deeds (kamma),
which does lead to the harm of oneself, of others, or of both [M. I.
417]. This altruistic feature of Buddhist moral law (dhammaniyaama)
can be considered as criterion of establishing and promoting a ‘desired
society.’
6. Egalitarianism is
said to be one of the most remarkable characteristics of the Buddha's
teachings. Considering caste system (va.n.naa/va.rnaa) as a moral bar against personal freedom, and a
perpetual bar against social advancement, the Buddha stresses on the equality
and universal fraternity of all individuals. Pre-Buddhist theory of ethics (dharma)
was based the division of four-caste society (va.rnaa), namely, rulers (k.satriya),
priests (braahm.na), merchants and cultivators (vai'sya),
and the servants ('suudra). The first two were
considered as superior, while the last two have to serve them. Such an ethical
theory is antagonistic to the Buddha, who bases on his dhamma/dharma on
ethical equality. All claims based on the basic of distinction of birth, caste,
sex and social position for supremacy in society are, therefore, condemned
strongly by the Buddha. According to the Buddha, it is one’s intentional deeds
(kamma) that make him noble or ignoble:
"By birth, one is not a braahmin or
an out-caste (vasala). It is his kamma that makes one a braahmin or
an out-caste (vasala)" [Sn. p.
23]. In another important passage of Diighanikaaya,
the Buddha further says that being a virtuous person (braahmin)
[cf. Dhp. 383-423] is
possible only when one attempts in promoting his moral conduct and wisdom:
"Not by matted hair, nor by family, nor by birth does one become a br hma� . He who is perfect in knowledge and conduct is the foremost
among the men and deva" [Dhp. 393; D. II.
86]. The Order of monks, founded by the Buddha, is a remarked example of moral
theory of equality amongst human beings. The Buddha boldly claims that:
All
persons, notwithstanding whatever family they come, when entering the Buddhist
Order, would give up their former distinction of name and clan (jahanti purimaani naamagottaani) and be equally known as the recluses of
the son of Saakyaa (sama.naa
Saakyaputtiyaa tveva sa"nkha"m gacchati),
just like the waters of various rivers, such as Gangaa,
Yamunaa, Aciravatii, once
entering the ocean, will become one with the ocean, known as ocean-water"
[A. IV. 202; Vin. II. 239].
The
only ‘distinction between individuals’ (puggala-vemattataa)
is biologically sex-difference [Sn. vv. 600-11]. Thus, the equality
among human beings (cattaaro va.n.naa samasamaa) being in
accordance with the universal law and its contrary (dhammeneva
no adhammena) is considered as the basic moral
doctrine of equality in terms of psycho-ethical law of kamma. This
ethical equality among sentient beings, whether human or animal, shows that all
are capable of doing both good (kusala) and
evil (akusala) according to their volitional
action (kamma), irrespective of their
background, leading to the morally spiritual advancement or amorality (akiriyavaada) respectively. Ethical endeavor leading
ethical advancement is, therefore, equally possible for all. In Buddhist
ethics, the path of moral perfection is open to all those who wish to attain
the summum bonum of life (nibbaana).
7. Buddhist ethics is
Middle-Path (majjhimaa pa.tipadaa) ethics. It lays great emphasis on
avoidance of twofold extreme (antaa) of
practice, namely, (i) the extreme of sensual
indulgence or extreme hedonism (kaamasukhallikaanuyoga)
and (ii) the extreme of self-mortification or extreme asceticism (attakilamathaanuyoga). The former, as a form of
gross materialism, disturbing the peace and purity of the mind (citta), will conduce to amoralism
(akiriyavaada), while the latter, as
self-torture, resulted in weak physical body, leading to a poor spiritualism,
which can not be considered as steps to attain
highest enlightenment (vimutti) [KS. II.
52; DB. I. 223-40]. Buddhist ethics is called the middle
doctrine (majjhena dha"mma"m
deseti) [S. II. 61; S. V.
421; Vin. I. 10], because it goes far beyond the twofold
extreme as mentioned above. The Buddha considers self-mortification (attakilamathaanuyoga) as painful, fruitless,
unprofitable and ignoble [M. I. 77, 238, 342; MLS. I.
103-4; A. I. 295; II. 206; D. I. 166]. It may
result in emancipating the body and filling the mind with evil thoughts. With
regard to sensual indulgence or extreme hedonism (kaamasukhallikaanuyoga),
the Buddha says that it will lead to moral degeneration. It bounds one to
egoism and involves in samsaaric rebirth [M. I.
77, 238, 342; MLS. I. 103-4; A. I. 295; II.
206]. The Middle Way (majjhimaa pa.tipadaa) discovered by the
Buddha is an unique path (ekamagga),
"which opens the eyes, bestows wisdom, insight, leads to peace, and
conduces to nibbaana" [D. II.
312; M. I. 61; M. III. 251]. Buddhist ethics
also seeks to reject the extreme theories of eternalism
(sassatavaada) and annihilationism (ucchedavaada) while advocating the theory of
becoming (pratiityasamutpaada) in the realm of
ethico-spiritual practice. Eternalism
(sassatavaada) is eternalist theory that
everything exists absolutely (sabba"m atthi). Annihilationism (ucchedavaada)
is opposite theory that absolutely nothing exists (sabba"m
natthi). It also avoids not only the monistic
view, which reduces existence to a common ground, to some sort of self-existing
substance (sabba"m ekatta"m)
but also the opposite pluralistic view, which reduces existence to a
concatenation of discrete elements (sabba"m
puthutta"m) [S. II. 17; 77].
Avoiding these extremes, moral teaching of the middle way of the Buddha
explains that phenomena arise in dependence on other phenomena, without
assuming, however, a persistent substance behind the phenomena. According to
Buddhism, moral perfection lies in the Middle Path (majjhimaa
pa.tipadaa), which aims
at improving human moralism for the attainment of the highest enlightenment:
Buddhahood. In this very teaching (idheva) of
the Buddha, Sama.naship or Braahma.naship
[Dhp. 19, 20, 383-423], the attainment of
human perfection or sainthood, is exclusively possible while that of other
systems is void [M. I. 64; MLS, I.85].
8. I would claim that
the teachings of the Buddha could be considered as ethical empiricism. It moves
from facts, psychological and empirical, to ethics. The Four Noble Truths (ariyasacca/catvaari-aarya-satyaani)
are started with an empirical fact or a psychological fact and then goes on to
work out its application in two levels: one in terms of suffering causation or samsaric cycle, and the other in its solution to human
suffering for perfect morality. This moral procedure is aimed at bringing about
the destruction of the empirical or psychological fact in question by following
the path leading to the eradication of suffering (dukkha-nirdhagaaminii).
There is suffering (dukkha/du,hkha)
is a statement of fact, which should be realized in order to overcoming
it. Dukkha may be in the form of a feeling of sorrowfulness, dissatisfactoriness, or anguish� a psychological fact. It also may be in the form of physical pain
or an empirically observable phenomenon. Every suffering (dukkha/du.hkha) has its origin (dukkha-samudaya/du.hkha-samudaya). This is another statement of
empirical fact. From the recognition of dukkha as an empirical
or psychological fact, the Buddha proceeds to prescribe the path leading to the
cessation of suffering (dukkha-nirdhagaaminii-pa.tipadaa / du.hkha-maarga),
through the observance of which it could be removed (dukkha-nirodha/du.hkha-nirodha) [A.
I. 158]. This is also an empirical statement of fact, which the Buddha himself
has undergone and realized at the time of his enlightenment. Such a fact-based
ethics is a creative contribution of the Buddha to solve the problem of human
suffering.
9. Finally, Buddhist
ethics can be considered as moral soteriology. In Buddhism, the concept of
soteriology is expressed differently in Pali as mutti,
vimutti. mokkha and vimokka. It is the freedom from bondage
(sa"msaara) or release from the cycle of
suffering (dukkha). The entire teaching of the Buddha (Budhasaasana) is believed as a path to emancipation
(mokkha-magga). The Buddha himself repeatedly
emphasizes that his teaching: "As the vast ocean, O disciples, is
impregnated with one taste, the taste of salt, even so this doctrine and
discipline [of morality] is impregnated with one taste, the taste of
emancipation." The second statement reflected his moral soteriology is
found in a famous passage of the Samyuttanikaaya as
follows: "Both formerly and now, O Anuruudha, I
declare only suffering and its cessation" [Vin. II. 235]. This
has been explained in details in his first sermon after enlightenment that the
Dhamma is aiming at bringing about emancipation. The Buddha emphatically says
that if ignorance (avidyaa) is the root cause
(hetu paccaya)
of bondage in sa"msaaric existence then its
destroying and freeing the mind from defiling traits (aasavas)
are the path to release from sa"msaara. The
Noble Eightfold Path (ariya a.t.tha"ngika magga)
also called Middle Path (majjhimaa pa.tipadaa) consisting of
perfecting one’s own morality (siila),
improving mental culture (samaadhi) and
sharpening enlightened wisdom (pa~n~naa) is
the only way out of sa"msaara. This
clearly shows that the teachings of the Buddha are not negative in terms of
pessimism but bringing about the cessation of suffering (dukkha pamocana"m). Moreover, Buddhist ethics is, in its
very nature, positivistic in the sense that it recognizes the absolute
possibility of conducting moral, being good and cultivating perfection of all
sentient beings: "Put aside what is morally unwholesome. It is possible to
do so. If it were not impossible I would not ask
you" [A. I. 158]. "Just as there is suffering there is also
cessation of suffering" [M. I. 140] is the starting-point but also
the purpose of the Buddha's teachings. Because, according to the Buddha,
freedom always means ‘emancipation from suffering’ (dukkha pamocana"m), from bondage (mokkhanti
maara bandhanaa) [Dhp. 37] and burdens of existence (vimutto upadhisa"mkhaye)
[A. II. 24]. This is, in fact, the raison detre of Buddhism.
REFERENCES
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